

G. Riva, M.T. Anguera, B.K. Wiederhold and F. Mantovani (Eds.)  
**From Communication to Presence: Cognition, Emotions and Culture towards the  
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## 8 Strategic Emotion in Negotiation: Cognition, Emotion, and Culture

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**Abstract.** This chapter is an overview of research on emotion in negotiation that integrates cognitive, affective, and cultural aspects of the field. We address the following issues: (1) the effects of mood and emotion on negotiator cognition and performance and the potential of emotion as a negotiation strategy; (2) individual differences in emotional expression and individual traits, such as self-monitoring and emotional intelligence, that impact on the use of strategic emotion; and (3) cultural influences on negotiation and on emotional experience and expression.

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### 8.1 Emotion in Negotiation

Much emotion research has been devoted to the study of its relationship with cognition. According to psychologist Klaus Scherer [1], the dichotomous approach that views cognition as “an antagonist to emotion” and that sees emotion “as an impediment to the proper functioning” of cognition and rational thought has its roots in Plato and Aristotle’s philosophical musings (p. 563). In modern psychology, the debate over the primacy of cognition over emotion has and continues to draw a great deal of attention. On one side, cognition is championed as a necessary condition of emotion [2]. In this tradition, appraisal theories trace the elicitation of emotions to “subjective evaluations of the significance of events to the well-being of the person concerned” (p. 564) [1]. On the other side of the debate, Robert Zajonc, a major proponent of the independence of emotion, argues that emotion and cognition are distinct and separate processes and that experience of emotion is possible without cognitive input (i.e., cognitive evaluations) [3, 4]. These disparate perspectives, while promoting and deepening our understanding of the mechanism of the cognition-emotion interactions, unnecessarily cast cognition and emotion in opposition and preclude one in the smooth functioning of the other. In recent years, however, more efforts have been made to “integrate rather than oppose the two”—to incorporate affect in rational decision-making and cognitive appraisal in emotional reactions [1, 5].

This bit of history in the study of emotion provides a good context for an overview of research on emotion in negotiation, which began as a branch of psychological studies. For a long time, emotion was ignored while cognition (rational thinking) was treasured in negotiation. In the 1980s and 1990s, most negotiation research was conducted under a cognitive decision-making framework, which viewed the negotiator as a decision maker faced with an opponent and a situation [6]. The negotiator’s perception and interpretation of the opponent and situation greatly influence the judgments and decisions that he/she makes. Max Bazerman and Margaret Neale (see [7]) argue that “much of the suboptimality that can be observed in negotiation is the result of deviations from rationality in the judgmental processes of negotiators” (p. 247). For example, negotiators systematically make judgment errors about their opponent’s priority (the relative importance or weight of negotiation issues) and the compatibility of interest between the two (whether the two parties’ preferences for alternatives within a given issue are compatible). They often assume that the opponent assigns the same value to issues as they do and therefore there can be only a win-lose outcome on any issue; they also assume that the other party’s preferences must be completely incompatible with their own. In a distributive-integrative bargaining paradigm, in which the negotiator is guided with a win-lose or a win-win perspective, such perceptive errors can lead bargainers to work within a distributive frame and to focus on their individual interest only, thus reduce the potential for integrative gains and result in suboptimal outcomes [8].

Significant advances in negotiation research were achieved during this phase. However, it was also characterized by a disregard for emotion that deemed emotion as a hindrance to rational decision-making. Is negotiation all about the mind and rationality of the negotiator? What influence does emotion have on negotiator behavior and outcomes? And how do emotion and cognition interact in negotiation processes? In this chapter, our goal is to review recent developments in emotion and negotiation research that provide evidence for the importance of emotion in

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negotiation and that address the effective use of emotion by negotiators. We begin with a delineation of current literature on the influences of mood and emotion on negotiator cognition and behavior. We then turn our focus to a specific type of emotional display that can be highly cognitive and influential, i.e., strategic emotion, or the “on-demand emotional expression” [9]. Next we move on to a discussion of individual traits of the negotiator that affect the use of strategic emotion. Because strategic emotion involves the use of emotional expression as influence tactics, it requires cognitive evaluation on the part of the negotiator who uses these tactics (the *strategist*). We will explore individual characteristics that impact on the strategist’s assessment of the situation and the partner, his/her planning capacity for the appropriate and effective emotional expression needed for the situation, and the strategist’s behavioral control in communicating the tactical emotions. Before conclusion, we will also touch on the influence of culture on emotional expression and its implications for the emotional strategist who is faced with cultural variations. With this chapter we hope to integrate rather than contrast emotion and cognition. Negotiation, as a simultaneously cognitive (decision-making) and emotional (conflict-ridden) interaction, offers us an ideal venue for this endeavor.

#### *8.1.1 Affect in Negotiation: Mood and Emotion*

By the late 1990s, emotion was rediscovered by negotiation scholars; research interest in emotion has since been on the rise [10-12]. The conflict nature embedded in negotiations makes the activity frequently contentious and emotional. Thus, in Barry’s [9] words, “as an impetus for and byproduct of social conflict, emotion is potentially central to understanding how individuals think about, behave within, and respond to bargaining situations”(p. 94). Cognitive decision-making is not the only determinant of negotiation behavior; negotiators are human beings under the influence of their own emotions.

A delineation of research on emotion in negotiation calls for a conceptual distinction between mood and emotion, both of which are encompassed under the umbrella of the broader concept of affect. Mood and emotion are distinguished from each other by their relative pervasiveness and specificity. Moods are undifferentiated affective states that are relatively more pervasive, more enduring and less intense than emotions, and may not have an identifiable antecedent cause or a target [9]. We often identify our mood in broad, unspecific terms, such as good or bad. In contrast, emotions are discrete, of relatively short duration, and intentionally directed at a target [13-16]. The emotions we experience also come in a much wider variety than do moods—happiness, sadness, anger, fear, etc. Yet moods and emotions are also interdependent [17]. A person in a bad mood may be more likely to experience negative emotions like distress, anger, or sadness in response to certain stimuli, whereas a person given a pleasant surprise in the morning may bathe in a good mood for the rest of the day.

The majority of affect and negotiation research focuses on the intrapersonal effects of mood on negotiator behavior, i.e., the effects of mood on the negotiator’s own behavior [e.g., 11, 18-20]. Despite the heavier interpersonal nature of emotion and its potential as an influence strategy, it has been neglected and played second fiddle to the more pervasive but less differentiated mood as a predictor of negotiator cognition, behavior, and outcome. In a series of seminal studies, Alice Isen and her colleagues induced positive mood in experimental subjects prior to an experimental task by

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giving them cookies or leaving them a dime in the coin return of public phones, by asking them to sort funny cartoons and giving them a gift, and by making them watch a comedy film or giving them candy [19-21]. Results verified the effects of positive mood on cognition: negotiators' good mood carried over into the negotiation task and made the negotiators' cognitive processing more flexible and creative. In the words of the researchers [20], "good feelings increase the tendency to combine material in new ways and to see relatedness between divergent stimuli," thus facilitate creative thinking and problem solving (p. 1130).

Other researchers used similar positive mood manipulations, such as pleasant artificial scents, humorous videos, and false positive feedback on task performance [12, 18]. These studies consistently demonstrate ways in which positive affect influences social information processing. According to Forgas [22], people in a good mood are more likely than those in a neutral or bad mood to "adopt more creative, open, constructive, and inclusive thinking styles" (p. 18). This cognitive processing style in turn promotes a cooperative and integrative orientation in negotiators, making them more altruistic and helpful, confident and optimistic, and less contentious and more concessionary than their non-emotional counterparts [18, 19, 21, 23]. Thus, good mood appears to increase the use of cooperative and integrative strategies and lead to higher joint outcomes [11, 19, 24].

In a similar vein, negative mood affects negotiator behavior through a cognitive processing. Where positive mood leads to heuristic and flexible thinking, negative mood leads to more systematic and rational decision-making in negotiators [25]. Negative mood tends to create a focus on self-interest and increase the use of such distributive and competitive strategies as decreasing initial offers and using threat and aggression in the development of profitable agreements [26, 27]. Hertel, Neuhof, Theuer, and Kerr found that sad and insecure subjects (in a bad mood) displayed more rational behavior, such that they tended to defect when the other was cooperative and to cooperate when the other was uncooperative [28]. In terms of its effect on negotiation outcome, this cognitive and behavioral orientation easily contributes to conflict spirals, lower joint gains, and less satisfactory relationships [25, 29, 30].

The above findings suggest that while positive mood leads to cooperation and greater joint gain, negative mood leads to competition and greater individual gain because of the different cognitive processing styles associated with each. Mood is believed to influence negotiators' cognitive processing, thus their behavior, and thus affect negotiation outcomes. However, emotion, especially its tactical expression, works not only on self but on other cognition and consequently influence other behavior. In other words, emotion has a stronger interpersonal effect. We devote the rest of the section to an examination of the interpersonal effects of emotion, i.e., the effects of one negotiator's emotion on the other negotiator, to contribute to the small but growing body of research in this area [31-34].

The study of emotion and negotiation is characterized by a social functionalist approach that posits that emotion is informative, evocative, and serves as an incentive in social interactions and causes social consequences [35]. For example, positive emotion can signal cooperativeness and trustworthiness, elicit cooperation, trust, and concession from others, and promise rewards for others. Negative emotion, on the other hand, impresses the other party as aggressive, competitive, and reckless, elicits compliance from the other party, and signals punishment or negative consequences for the non-complying opponent [36]. Perhaps because positive

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emotion shares an undertone of cooperativeness with principled, integrative bargaining, it has received relatively more scholarly attention. On the other hand, negative emotions such as anger, frustration, and depression seem to violate the rational principle of integrative bargaining, which might be the reason that negative affect has not been studied as much. Then, in what is now a classic study of ultimatum games, Madan Pillutla and Keith Murnighan brought negative emotion back to the study of negotiator behavior [37]. Bargainers would reject economically beneficial offers, the authors found, out of anger and spite caused by their perception of unfairness in their opponents' offers, rather than on the basis of rational economic consideration. This study is a wonderful antidote to the purely rational and emotion-free approach to negotiation: negotiator behavior is not always guided or determined by rational analyses of utility. However imperfect and irrational negative emotions might be, they actually led bargainers to "revolt," despite knowledge of potential economic damage associated with such outbursts of feelings.

Since then we have seen fast growth in the amount of research on negative emotion (as compared to positive emotion), both because of a realization of its intricacies and complexities and of our insufficient understanding of its nature and impact on negotiation (e.g., see [36-39]). Despite their risk of relational damage, negative emotions do serve important social functions, because the stance negative negotiators take is likely to impress the other side as extreme, risky, reckless, and seemingly out of control [34, 36].

For this reason, they may be highly effective when used tactically to achieve an agreement. If negotiators do fall under the influence of negative emotions, e.g., anger, how exactly will it impact on negotiation outcomes? Arif Butt and colleagues report that anger expression of a negotiator lowers his/her opponent's outcome, possibly because displays of anger are signals of strong positions or threats, which in turn increase a negotiator's power [40]. Keith Allred, however, cautions that the use of anger may also bring retaliation. When negative emotions are used intentionally throughout the negotiation, targets will most likely feel unfair, offended, and angry. Once they are provoked to retaliate and to match their opponents' behavior with equal or greater anger, the strategy becomes counterproductive [38].

The lesson, then, seems to be that negotiators should be aware of messages of power hidden in emotions, which may be highly effective sources of social influence. If negotiators intend to influence their partners through affective displays, they first need to know which emotions are more powerful. Larissa Tiedens juxtaposes power messages behind expressions of anger and sadness. The expression of anger implies confidence and capability, whereas the expression of sadness (e.g., over disappointment) implies incompetence and subjugation. People confer more power and status on those who express anger than those who express sadness [41]. Although the study was not carried out in the negotiation context, Tiedens's findings fittingly apply to negotiation interactions. The normative integrative bargainer is taught not to get emotional and to maintain a positive, cooperative affect state during negotiations. However, when negotiators find it necessary to express their dissatisfaction, frustration, or hurt feelings, it might help establish their power status if they coat it in a high-power emotion like anger rather than in a low-power emotion like sadness or disappointment.

Anger has also been studied with other "powerful" negative emotions. Michael Morris and Dacher Keltner [34] argue that anger and contempt are major emotions displayed in the positioning phase of negotiation. Contempt works to convey

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information about status and is likely to evoke complementary emotions. Either the counterpart “internalizes the message of low regard, loses self-control and becomes easier to persuade, or he may become motivated to make concessions to win back the contemptuous one’s approval” (p. 30). In either case, contempt displays help establish relational dominance. Anger, on the other hand, signals one’s commitment to a position and warns the opponent that one may be prone to rash action, such as abandoning the negotiation and taking alternative measures. Thus anger-expressing people are seen as dominant and they evoke such complementary, low-power emotions as fear and guilt in the counterpart [42, 43]. Fear can lead a negotiator to yield and avoid behaviors that could offend or upset the other. Guilt may bring about restitution in the form of concessions. Both emotions steer the negotiator toward behaviors that benefit the angry opponent.

This limited body of research on emotion in negotiation suggests that emotions do not only affect negotiators’ cognitive processing, but also their social perception and relationships. Hence the social functional framework of emotional expression in negotiation [34]. Under this framework, negotiator emotion should be studied with regard to its functions in social interactions, i.e., “emotions that arise in response to one’s counterpart” and interaction dynamics (p. 5). As we mentioned earlier, a functionalist view posits that emotions serve informative (signaling information about feelings and intentions to one’s opponent), evocative (eliciting emotional or behavioral responses from others), and incentive (signaling rewards or punishments on the behavior of the other side) functions [35].

If emotion serves such important social functions, we may profit in both theory and practice by consciously managing and utilizing it as an influence strategy in social interactions such as negotiations. Such potential of emotion perfectly illustrates its complex relationship to cognition: there is rationality in the seemingly irrational use of emotions.

### *8.1.2 The Management of Emotion*

A few lines of research in the area of emotion management (e.g., emotional control, emotional regulation, and emotion work) bear on our discussion of strategic emotion in negotiation. Emotional control refers to an individual’s ability to exhibit (or avoid exhibiting) an emotional response as a matter of personal desire rather than as an involuntary consequence of environmental conditions [44]. It varies along four major dimensions: direction—it may lead to either the amplification or inhibition of emotional expression; target of control—whether it is directed at the management of one’s own emotions, or at the emotional expression of another party; onset of control—whether it is the effort at initiating control prior to experiencing an actual emotion, or the effort to redirect an emotional response following the onset of that response; and finally, nature of transformation—some control efforts are intended to alter the intensity levels of existing emotions; others entail the substitution of one emotion for another; still others attempt to mask emotions [9, 45].

Similarly, emotional regulation is a “heterogeneous set of processes by which emotions are themselves regulated” [46]. Basic processes are reappraisal and suppression. Reappraisal modifies how we evaluate situations that induce emotions. For example, we may tell ourselves that a sad scene in a movie is cheap cliché without genuine feelings so that we do not find it moving and cry about it. Robert Sutton observed that when bill collectors followed the professional norm of

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conveying urgency and irritation to debtors that they did not genuinely feel and thus encountered emotive dissonance, they used reappraisals to help them become emotionally detached [47]. Suppression is about inhibiting emotion-expressive behavior, which decreases self-reported experiences of such emotions as pain, pride, and amusement (but not disgust or sadness). In other words, by suppressing the expression of certain emotions, we may reduce the intensity with which we feel them.

Emotion work is defined as “the management of feelings to create a publicly observable facial and bodily display” [48]. Social contexts provide cues to display rules—expectations and obligations regarding appropriate emotional expression in a given situation or a given role—which in turn guide emotion work by individuals. For example, humility and modesty are behavioral norms in some East Asian societies, and individuals are expected to behave accordingly. When someone wins a valued prize for extraordinary work, no matter how happy and excited he/she is about the honor, the particular display rule in that society stipulates that this individual work on his/her emotions so that he/she displays not exaltation but only mild satisfaction and even a touch of self-deprecation. Emotion work takes the forms of surface acting, when an individual expresses or displays emotions that are not personally felt, and deep acting, when the individual seeks to internalize the emotion that is to be displayed [48]. In the context of negotiation, to the extent that negotiators follow display rules to express “appropriate” and desired emotions, they are doing emotion work, very likely surface acting. But who would choose, under what circumstances, to adopt emotion work?

## 8.2 Strategic Emotion and the Negotiator

As a negotiator displays sadness or frustration that he does not genuinely feel in order to evoke the opponent’s compassion, as he tries to mask the happiness of achieving a desired outcome so that the opponent does not become alarmed and discontent, or when he makes an effort to stay calm while truly infuriated by his opponent just because that is the appropriate thing to do, the negotiator engages in emotion management. Therefore, the question raised above resonates in all three lines of conceptually related, complementary research—emotional control, emotional regulation, and emotion work. The emotion management literature indicates that emotional expression as negotiation strategy is closely linked with one’s goals, tendencies, and competencies regarding expressive display. Imagine a negotiator who plans for a display of fury to extract a concession from his opponent but who, having a generally happy and agreeable disposition, is incapable of executing such negative behavior and, contrary to his intention, exhibits a much milder affect state that is not compelling to his opponent at all. Put another way, successful strategic emotion requires accurate assessment of the emotional needs in specific situations, integration of such needs with one’s affective tendencies (e.g., some are more prone to positive or negative emotional display than others), and efficacy in deploying the strategy.

This brings us to the second segment of the paper—what individual differences influence emotion management in negotiation? Surely we do not all share the same emotional management styles and competencies. Next we discuss some individual characteristics that we believe to be most proximately related to the strategic expression of emotions, drawn from literature in personality, emotion,

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communication, and impression management. We consider each of the following in terms of its bearing on the strategic use of emotions in a negotiation setting: affectivity, emotional expressivity, emotional intelligence, and self-monitoring.

### *8.2.1 Individual Differences in Emotional Expression*

#### *8.2.1.1 Affectivity*

Dispositional affectivity—which captures individual tendencies in emotional experience—includes positive affectivity and negative affectivity, the latter of which has received more scholarly attention [49]. Individuals who score high on this dimension are susceptible to tension, anxiety, and nervousness and are much more likely to experience these emotions than those who score low on this dimension [50]. Jack Haney suggests that high negative-affectivity individuals tend to judge ambiguous stimuli in a much more negative light than low negative-affectivity individuals [51]. As negotiators, high negative-affectivity individuals are not only more likely to experience negative emotions during typical conflict-ridden moments of contention, but also when they are faced with ambiguity in the situation and the opponent. Therefore, they may prefer negative to positive emotions as well.

#### *8.2.1.2 Emotional Expressivity*

Emotional expressivity depicts a stable individual trait associated with emotion-expressive behavior, i.e., how much emotion is displayed [52]. Early expressivity measures treated this trait as a unidimensional construct varying from low to high on a single continuum [53]. James Gross and Oliver John noted the inadequacy of this conceptualization and developed a multifaceted scale that incorporated multiple dimensions such as positive expressivity, negative expressivity, impulse strength, the confidence with which individuals express emotion, and the ability to mask emotion [52]. The first two aspects are most relevant to our purpose here: Individuals high in positive expressivity, for example, laugh more when they find something funny, and individuals high in negative expressivity cry more when they are sad. According to the rational (emotionally neutral) negotiation approach, high expressivity, either positive or negative, could be detrimental for a negotiator, because the overflowing emotions may reveal too much about a negotiator's positions, preferences, and strategies. An unsuppressed smile or frown at an offer obviously signals to the opponent that the negotiator is satisfied or dissatisfied with the offer and therefore implies his/her position and goal. An emotionally expressive bargainer may also be considered lacking in his/her ability to regulate or control emotions. However, emotional expressivity also has implications for the conscious and tactical use of emotions. For example, if I am an expressive individual with high expressive confidence and masking abilities, I might be more willing to choose to use emotional strategies than a low-expressivity individual.

Therefore, affectivity and emotional expressivity both center around natural individual tendencies toward emotion, with affectivity focusing on emotional experience and expressivity capturing emotional expression. These traits would presumably impact on affective behaviors in negotiation, but since they do not capture the cognitive and strategic-motivational processes (e.g., evaluating the situation to determine specific needs for emotional display, goal-setting guided by such evaluation, and behavioral planning for the enactment of strategy), we believe

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strategic emotional display would be influenced more heavily by the following traits that do embody individual differences in the conscientious management of emotions.

### 8.2.1.3 Emotional Intelligence

Emotional intelligence (EI) refers to four branches of core emotional regulation competencies—perceiving emotions, using emotions to facilitate thinking, understanding emotions, and managing emotions [54, 55]. The first two branches constitute Experiential EI; the last two branches make up Strategic EI. As part of Strategic EI, understanding involves knowledge of “emotional information, how emotions combine and progress, and how to reason about emotional meanings.” Managing emotions, on the other hand, “specifically pertains to a person’s ability to manage and regulate feelings in oneself and others” (p. 178) [56]. Thus strategic EI may be directly related to strategic emotional displays in negotiations—it depicts both cognitive and behavioral capacity needed for the task. Individuals high in EI, especially strategic EI, are more likely to be able to maintain control over their affective state than those low in EI. They may be able to use emotions strategically, “knowing when to and when not to express emotion, and knowing how much and in what form to express emotion when its use is necessary” [57].

### 8.2.1.4 Self-Monitoring

Self-monitoring might well be the most important dispositional trait considered in this chapter in relation to emotion in negotiation. Self-monitoring is concerned with the processes by which individuals actively plan, enact, and guide their behavior in social situations. Mark Snyder prescribes two sources of information that guide these activities—cues to situational or interpersonal specifications of behavioral appropriateness and cues to inner states, dispositions, and attitudes [58]. Individuals differ in the extent to which they rely on either information source to guide their actions in social contexts. High self-monitoring individuals ask the question: “What does the situation demand of me and what image should I project?” They demonstrate exquisite situation-to-situation discriminativeness and variation in their social behavior, and the correspondence between behavior and attitude is often low [59-61]. In contrast, low self-monitoring individuals ask: “Who am I and how should I be me?” They are characterized by a heavier reliance on relevant inner states to guide their behavior and by a lower level of responsiveness to situational and interpersonal specifications of appropriateness. With these individuals, correspondence between behavior and attitude is typically substantial.

Research suggests that emotional self-regulation is essential to understanding the link between emotional expression and self-monitoring, because how well expressive behavior—at center stage in our social interactions—is interpreted and received depends on effective regulation of such behavior [62]. High self-monitors are good at controlling and concealing their emotional displays, because they are not only sensitive to, but also willing to adapt their behavior in a manner consistent with, situational requirements [58, 63-64]. For example, high self-monitors may be more sensitive to the power differential implied in various emotions discussed earlier (e.g., anger and contempt vs. fear and guilt), and thus more adept at choosing to display the appropriate emotion to their advantage. Emotion-expressive behavior, falling in their repertoire of behavioral control, is their strength in comparison to low self-monitors.

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This control, as well as the ability to signal a wide range of emotional states, could potentially make high self-monitoring negotiators effective emotional strategists [65].

If self-regulation of emotional expression proves an issue of centrality to emotional intelligence and self-monitoring, it gives us reason to consider conceptual similarities between the two characteristics. Both require cognitive and perceptive processing of the situation and “on-demand” emotions; and both presume behavioral competency to display emotions befitting a particular context. The major difference between the two is that emotional intelligence focuses on emotional expression, while self-monitoring guides a wider range of self-presentation behaviors. Both traits might predict the effective use of strategic emotions.

Closely related to emotional intelligence and self-monitoring is the idea of impression management, which is involved with the behaviors people direct toward others to create and maintain desired perceptions of themselves [66]. Impression management is rooted in Erving Goffman’s dramaturgical theory. According to Goffman, people are “actors” engaging in “performances” in various “settings” before “audiences” [67]. Actor and audience interactions define the situation and provide stimuli or motivation for the actor’s behavior. Because the act of managing impressions requires a certain degree of comprehension of the specific demands of situations and audiences, self-monitoring ability may play a moderating role in the process as it reflects one’s sensitivity to such demands.

When the presentation of an intended image requires affective behavior, a connection is established between impression management and emotional expression. For example, a bill collector’s professional image in front of a debtor is intentionally emotional—urgency represented by “high arousal with a hint of irritation”—so as to increase the likelihood that debtors would pay off their debt [47]. A negotiator who wants to gain an edge might decide to present him/herself in an arrogant manner to signal status, contempt, and, ultimately, dominance, thus eliciting complementary emotional reactions in the opponent, which may indeed lead the latter to lose the edge. In this sense, emotion management (emotional control, regulation and emotion work, etc.) is other-directed, affective impression management—both comprise a cognitive mechanism and impact not only presentation of the self but also experience of the other person (or, through interpersonal influence, eventually own experience). Impression management research has not paid adequate attention to emotion in the past, but it will certainly benefit from the inclusion of emotion [68].

The four individual differences reviewed in this section can be grouped into two categories. Dispositional expressivity and affectivity are stable personality traits that predict the emotions individuals habitually, genuinely, or “unconsciously” experience and express. Emotional intelligence and self-monitoring, on the other hand, guide expressive behavior that individuals plan and manage to display or withhold from displaying and that does not necessarily correspond to their genuine emotional experience. The latter group has an individual efficacy component and involves one’s ability to plan and execute strategies. It is this quality that links these traits to the strategic use of emotion in negotiation and provides insights into the mechanism of strategic emotion. We address the planning and enacting aspects of self-monitoring and its significance in negotiation strategies next.

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### *8.2.2 Strategic Use of Emotion and Self-Monitoring in Negotiation*

The strategic use of emotion in negotiation, according to Barry [9], is “the willful use of emotional display or expression as a tactical gambit by an individual negotiator” (p. 94). Also called on-demand emotional expression, it could reflect dissociation from one’s genuine emotional experience, in that a negotiator displays emotions that are sometimes altered in intensity or nature, and at other times not driven by real emotional experience at all. Our review of emotional management suggests that the strategic use of emotion is a type of management work and overlaps with some of the management concepts discussed earlier. In order to use emotions strategically, individuals need to be able to exercise emotional control and engage in emotion work if they intend to project a desired self image. The strategy also calls to attention individual differences considered previously. A strategic negotiator assesses the need for specific emotions, plans for the display of such emotions, and executes the plan with appropriate expressive behavior. The components of this task render certain individual traits considerably influential in emotional strategies, especially those affecting the negotiator’s management efficacy of expressive behavior, e.g., emotional intelligence and self-monitoring.

We want point out that although the strategic use of emotion may be initiated by one party in a negotiation, it is not merely an other-directed tactic that either succeeds or fails in its attempt at interpersonal influence. Negotiators interact with each other and their emotions evolve in the process. One party’s planned emotional expressions may arouse genuine changes in the other party’s emotions, attitudes, and behaviors. In turn, the interdependency between two negotiators makes it likely that genuine, rather than planned, emotional encounters and interactions proceed after the initial acting. As strategic and genuine emotions entangle, it might become difficult for even the strategist to distinguish the two. Emotional responses from the target, whether or not anticipated by the initial strategist, might affect the emotional experience of the strategist, whose emotional display may detract from the original path he/she designs. Because of this interpersonal effect of emotion, it is imperative that we study both the strategist and the target, rather than considering the general negotiator indiscriminately. Next we turn to a discussion of individual differences that influence the performance of the strategist and the target.

#### *8.2.2.1 The Strategist*

The specific goals of the negotiator determine which emotions are in demand and how they should be displayed. Are emotions used to maintain good relationships, to assert oneself, to seek agreements and/or concessions, to manage ambiguities and uncertainties, as when a negotiator has very little knowledge of the opponent’s interests and alternatives, or to inform an opponent of one’s power, commitment, or position? What emotional strategies are called for in each of these circumstances? Because of the unlimited range of contexts that require emotional strategies, self-monitoring seems to be an individual characteristic most well suited for our investigation of the predictors of strategic emotional expression—possibly more so than emotional intelligence, if only because of the broader scope of strategic, “managed” behaviors that are guided by self-monitoring. After all, high self-monitors, by definition, are more sensitive to situational cues. They may be better at recognizing circumstances that demand the use of emotional (as well as substantive)

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strategies and they may plan and act accordingly. Therefore, even though self-monitoring is not as directly related to emotion as it is to self-presentation in general, it represents an important mechanism of evaluation, planning, and enactment, which is key to strategic emotions.

Before negotiators initiate an emotional strategy, they must be sufficiently aware of the negotiation situation and of their opponent and accordingly choose the specific emotions needed. Evidence clearly points to high self-monitors' heightened awareness of what the situation and the opponent demand and their superior ability to modify behavior in accordance. In a study by Roloff and Campion, self-monitoring was examined in the context of negotiator accountability to a constituency. When held accountable, high self-monitors were more likely than low self-monitors to conform closely to their constituency's objectives when making initial offers but then to stray away in their final offers [69]. This finding indicates that high self-monitors' self-presentation is indeed adjusted on the basis of perceived situational or relational demand. Early in the negotiation, when initial offers were an indication of responsibility to one's constituency, accountable negotiators, both high and low in self-monitoring, complied with the goals of the constituency. Later in the negotiation, however, high self-monitors' sensitivity to situational and relational cues took over and made them more cooperative with their opponents in order to reach an agreement, whereas low self-monitors continued to adhere to the objectives of their constituents.

Applying this feature of high self-monitors to the strategic use of emotions, we surmise that they are more likely to be better emotional strategists because of their greater awareness and more accurate assessment of what emotions the situation demands. After evaluating the situation, emotional strategists begin to plan for emotional expression. Jordan and Roloff demonstrated that high self-monitoring negotiators were better at interaction planning of impression management strategies and integrative tactics. They concluded that high self-monitors were better able to accomplish negotiation goals as a result of their superior planning skills [70].

Additionally, we may speculate that self-monitoring is related to communication skills required to express intended emotions through verbal or nonverbal channels. In general, high self-monitors, guided by their behavioral sensitivity and adaptability, may be more effective communicators than are their low self-monitoring counterparts.

Thus it is very likely that self-monitoring is positively related to the planning and enactment of emotional strategies. Future research is needed to empirically test the link between self-monitoring and the variability and complexity of strategic emotion planning and the behavioral repertoire representing strategic emotional behaviors.

Although an exhaustive contemplation of all the individual differences is well beyond the scope of this review, factors discussed previously—emotional expressivity, affectivity, and emotional intelligence—do seem to bear significantly and positively on the strategic use of emotions. They also appear to be positively related to or overlap with self-monitoring ability, the primary individual quality examined in this chapter.

#### 8.2.2.2 *The Target*

The strategist alone does not determine the success of tactical emotions. As we offered earlier, the target, so called because he/she is the intended destination of the strategist's emotional influence, is not a mere receiver of emotional strategies. Since

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the strategist's ultimate goal is to exert influence on the perception, attitude and emotion of the target, it is important that we explore how the target perceives and reacts to emotional expressions of the strategist, and when strategic emotions are most likely to be successful with targets.

#### *8.2.2.2.1 Emotional Congruence*

Impression management sheds light on the target's interpretation of and reaction to strategic emotion, in which process both actor and audience contribute to the definition of a situation and stipulate behavioral requirements. The audience's definition of and response to the situation are significant components in impression management processes [68]. Schneider asserts that just as important as the actor's situational definition, the audience's definition of the situation includes expectations regarding appropriate roles and actor behavior. Together, "the perceived congruence between the actor's actual behavior and the audience's expectations is a key determinant of audience attributions and affective reactions" [66]. Since impression management is all about presenting a desired image, it is crucial that the impression manager gauge the attitudes and emotions of the audience so as to make the impression compelling.

Drawing on this stream of research, we may regard strategic emotional expression as actual actor behavior, and consider the possibility that the success of this strategy largely depends on the emotional expectations of the target/audience. The greater the emotional congruence the target perceives between the strategist's actual and target's anticipated emotional expression, the more likely the emotional strategy will succeed. A grim negotiator who sees the negotiation at hand as a critical last encounter in a series of talks and who is ready to be combative to achieve preset goals may not appreciate the positive emotions displayed by his counterpart in an effort to dissipate past grievances and lead the interaction onto a cooperative track. Or, if one party still holds grudges about unfair prior transactions with the other party and expects the latter to show remorse and solemnity, emotional incongruence will again dampen the actor's attempts at jovial smiles and hearty jokes. In other words, strategic emotion might be more influential if it is consistent with what the target anticipates as appropriate behavior.

We do acknowledge that emotional congruence is not a necessary condition for emotional tactics to be effective. A strategically angry negotiator might take the opponent by surprise and even compel a concession from the latter, even though the opponent has not anticipated or identified with the affective display. However, observations of real or simulated negotiations suggest that there may be just as many instances where emotional congruence does matter, which again puts a demand on the emotional intelligence and self-monitoring abilities of the negotiator. The specificity of emotional congruence, therefore, is ripe for empirical inquiry. In particular, under what conditions is emotional congruence vital to the success of the strategist? Would emotional congruence be particularly important to relational negotiations as compared to transactional negotiations? Also, are there emotions whose efficaciousness relies more heavily on perceived emotional congruence than other emotions? An example of a successful strategy that defies the principle of emotional congruence could be that when I expect my opponent to be angry with me but instead he deliberately adopts a happy and forgiving style, I might actually be more willing to comply with his requests. On the contrary, if I expect my opponent to be guilty and apologetic but he decides to be cheerful and to remind me to "look to

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future opportunities,” I might feel utterly disgusted and refuse to cooperate. These are realistic concerns about the target that the strategist needs to consider in advance.

#### 8.2.2.2.2 *Self-Monitoring*

Research on self-monitoring consistently depicts high self-monitors as experts with people. For instance, they are more likely than low self-monitors to notice and accurately remember information about someone they expect to interact with [71]. High self-monitoring individuals are not only keenly attentive to the actions of other individuals, but also particularly skilled at interpreting the nonverbal expressive behavior of other individuals to correctly infer their affective experience and emotional states, which is emphasized in Lennox and Wolfe’s revision of the Self-monitoring Scale (sensitivity to expressive behavior of others and ability to modify self-presentation subscales) [72, 73]. In summary, high self-monitors seem to be more perceptive than low self-monitors of the emotions, motivations, and behaviors of others [74]. How does this play out for the target? A logical development from the description above is that high self-monitoring individuals may be better detectors of implicit strategic emotion and less approving of such manipulative tactics. Research on self-monitoring and reaction to emotional tactics is nonexistent, but we may infer from empirical work on ingratiation, another self-presentation and influence tactic. Mark Snyder shows that high self-monitors are less receptive to ingratiation than low self-monitors [58]. Edward Jones and Roy Baumeister report that high self-monitors reacted positively when the actor was moderately agreeable but reacted negatively when the actor was overly ingratulatory. Low self-monitors, on the other hand, just liked the actor more as he tried to be more agreeable [75]. Different evaluations of ingratulatory behavior emerged possibly because high self-monitors were not only more sensitive to the actor’s behavior, but also to his incentives; and their evaluation changes under the actor’s different incentive frames. Would the strategic use of emotions be similarly detected and interpreted by high self-monitors? People do not like to be manipulated, and high self-monitoring individuals know it when they are!

Ironically, however, the scenario could also play out in the opposite direction. High self-monitors are characterized by sensitivity to other behavior and adaptability of self-presentation. They might be so attuned to others’ needs that they would fall easier preys to the strategist’s manipulations than low self-monitors would. Therefore, we believe that these two competing hypotheses would be a worthy topic for future research on the relations between target self-monitoring and the effectiveness of emotional strategies. The same trait that enhances emotional strategies when possessed by the strategist may turn into its own nemesis when possessed by the target; conversely, it might also help the strategist in achieving his/her goals.

### 8.3 Cultural Influences on Negotiation

The growth of a global economy necessitated intercultural communication and exchange, much of which involves negotiation, be it the starting up of a joint venture, the purchase of a foreign player by a professional athletic club, or the arrangement for a musician to give a concert in another country. As negotiators repeatedly report miscommunication and misunderstandings on the bargaining table, it becomes increasingly important that we study cultural influences on negotiation [76-77]. Cultural psychologists have long promoted a “culture-inclusive” psychology that

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affords wonderful insights into the study of negotiation [79]. So far, most of negotiation research was done within Western cultures, which makes the generalizability of findings across cultures problematic as emotional processes and negotiation behaviors are not universal but rather predicated on specific cultural norms. Negotiation research can benefit greatly from cross-cultural perspectives.

Culture differences, such as those between vertical and horizontal cultures, are found in how people process social information [80]. Vertical cultures are characterized by social hierarchy and deference to status; horizontal cultures, on the other hand, are characterized by social equality and a low power distance. Negotiators from these two types of cultures are likely to interpret and use power differently. Power distance is expected to be highest in vertical collectivist cultures and lowest in horizontal individualist cultures. People from vertical, high power distance countries such as China, Japan, or Turkey are more likely to resort to their superiors rather than their own experiences and peers to resolve conflicts within their work groups; they are less likely to argue against or negotiate with their bosses; and they are more likely to use their position power when negotiating with those lower in the hierarchy [81]. A professor from an American business school who taught negotiation in a Chinese executive MBA program observed that managers in her class were hesitant to contend with their superiors from work who were in the same negotiation training program. As a result, they did not realize the level of individual gain achieved by managers who negotiated with their peers.

The influence of culture is also seen in the experience and expression of emotions. Hazel Markus and Shinobu Kitayama introduced the categorization of independent and interdependent cultures and drew comparisons between the two in the areas of self concept, socialization, and everyday emotional experience [82-84]. Through development of the self and socialization processes, culture determines the origin, content, and intensity of one's emotional experience. In independent cultures like the US, the ideal self is positively unique from others, independent and self-reliant, and associated with positive self feelings and high self-esteem. Feelings and expressions of happiness are central in social interactions [85]. In an interdependent culture like Japan, however, happiness relies more on "an awareness and assurance of connection and interdependence" (p. 129) than on a positive self-concept [84]. In terms of the intensity of emotions, Japanese respondents reported lower intensity levels of both positive and negative affect than American ones. An explanation for the difference might be found in the socialization process of the Japanese respondents, which typically does not pay as much attention to the registration and recall of self-feelings [86].

Culture also provides an important explanation for different patterns of emotional expression. Taking the individualism vs. collectivism conceptualization [80], we may assume that, compared to Americans (in an individualist, independent culture), Chinese negotiators (in a collectivist, interdependent culture) are more likely to remain calm and less likely to reveal the true emotions they feel during a negotiation so as to keep conflicts minimal and maintain good relations with their opponents. Given the independent/interdependent culture categorization, we may predict that negotiation behaviors are influenced by the already existing social relationships between negotiators, such that more competitiveness and aggressiveness are expected in independent relationships whereas more cooperation and compromises are expected in interdependent relationships. Further, we can speculate on how Chinese negotiate with Americans—how do they display their

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emotions, whether positive or negative, and how do they interpret the other's display? Are there inaccuracies or errors in understanding and interpreting one's opponent? If so, what are the consequences?

To answer all these questions and to be able to apply this knowledge in cross-cultural negotiations requires a general understanding of cultural psychology. Moreover, negotiators also need a capacity for cognitive processing and emotional control so that individuals can accurately perceive, interpret, and create meanings in specific cultural environments, especially when strategic behavior and emotion are concerned. In the current global environment, this will be an area of negotiation research that proves especially fruitful and rewarding.

#### 8.4 Concluding Remarks

In this chapter we have discussed several aspects of research on emotion and negotiation. The effects of mood and emotion on negotiator cognition and performance led us to ponder the strategic potential of emotional expression. Incorporating research on individual differences in emotional expression, we turned to the use of strategic emotions in negotiations. Individual factors, self-monitoring in particular, in both the strategist and the target, were considered, as well as the dynamics between negotiators that affect the effectiveness of strategic emotion. Finally, we discussed the issue of cultural influences in negotiation and briefly reviewed research on cultural differences in emotional experience and expression.

Negotiation is indeed a fascinating site where we can observe the intertwining of cognition, emotion, and culture in shaping social behaviors. Strategic emotion, in particular, is the tactical display of emotions that calls for the negotiator's cognitive evaluation and planning, emotional regulation and presentation, and cultural sensitivity. Even the individual traits we addressed have both cognitive and emotional elements in them. Empirical work on strategic emotion and the emotional strategist is needed to advance our knowledge of negotiation and strategy. We conclude this chapter with a look at one of our recent efforts in this direction.

In a study on how negotiators enact positive and negative emotional strategies, we found that strategic negative negotiators (i.e., those instructed to adopt a negative emotional strategy) not only increased their negative display during the negotiation, as instructed, but also significantly increased their positive display [87]. Eventually, these strategists outperformed their targets and their strategic positive counterparts (i.e., negotiators instructed to employ a positive emotional strategy). A plausible interpretation is that, in order to maximize the effect of strategic negative emotions, these strategists decided to also maintain a seemingly contradictory positive display, either in an effort to counteract the negative relational impact of negative emotions or to induce more cooperative behaviors by means of a contrast strategy of positive display. Past research on negotiation has touched on this "dual display" phenomenon. In a study of role-differentiation as a negotiation team tactic, Brodt and Tuchinsky reported that the bad-cop/good-cop routine was more successful than just the good-cop/good-cop or the bad-cop/bad-cop arrangement. In the latter case, pressuring by two "bad cops" actually backfired [88]. Hilty and Carnevale addressed a similar tactic—what they called the "black-hat/white-hat" strategy—in an earlier study and found that strategy shifts played an important role in negotiation, such that when a new strategy was presented, participants made more and bigger concessions [89].

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Interestingly enough, two people were not necessary for executing this dual strategy. In fact, one person playing both the good and the bad cop, so long as the transformation is coherent and stable, is sufficient in producing the intended influence on the opponent [64, 89]. That participants in our study adopted this dual contrast strategy strongly suggests that strategic emotion is a highly complex behavior that is simultaneously cognitive and affective.

Existing research on the highly nuanced interpersonal effects of dual play strategy invites direct empirical exploration of whether the combination of negative and positive emotional strategies is more effective than either strategy alone in its influence on individual outcomes. If emotional strategies, especially dual strategies, are complex and subtle processes that require much evaluation, planning, and execution, individual traits like self-monitoring could have a vital part in this process, because it represents negotiators' capacity for such cognitive and behavioral tasks. It is possible that high self-monitoring negotiators can accurately judge how much positive versus negative emotional display is needed and how to maintain the balance between the two; they may also be superior than low self-monitors at administering the right "dose" of the needed emotions. If this explanation can be tested in future research, it will offer valuable information on the dynamics of strategic emotion in negotiation and communication in general.

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